The safety of beef with respect to foot and mouth disease (FMD) is determined by the level of riskwhichthe exporting region poses through disease prevalence, the reliability of the surveillance system of the region, the efficacy of the prevention and control measures, the efficiency of the Veterinary Services and the support of the private sector. The South American continent has been regionalised in accordance with these criteria. Today there are approximately 90 million cattle in a territory of over 5 million km 2 comprising regions classified as having a very low to low level risk for FMD with regard to the export of animals and animal products. Another 50 million cattle live in regions classified as posing a moderate risk. These risk categories reflect varying levels of risk. The harvest of beef in the meat-exportin g regions of South America includes a series of risk mitigation measures, from the origin of the source herd to the final packing of the beef. These measures reduce the unrestricted risk estimate by almost six orders of magnitude. Therefore, the final risk of FMD for the global trade of beef originating from the low risk regions in South America is extremely small.
Introduction
Historically, livestock production has been one of the cornerstones of the economies of South American countries and the production of meat and meat products for export is an important economic activity of several countries. For the past ten years the mean annual exports of meat and meat products from the region is about 490,000 tons, representing a value of US$840 million (G. Davis and J. Leslie, personal communication). Figure 1 shows the location of the main cattle breeding and production systems of South America.
The southern region of the continent comprising the River Plate Basin area includes Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and the three southern states of Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná). This region covers a territory of nearly 4 million hectares with 1,300,000 farms, and has a large livestock population consisting of 99 million cattle, 68 million sheep and 16 million swine (22) . The north-western region includes Colombia and the adjacent region of Venezuela (Zulia and Tachira) covering an area of 1,122,000 hectares and a livestock population of more than 8 million cattle, 1,700,000 sheep and 2,500,000 swine on 750,000 farms (23).
Historical perspectives
During the middle of the 19th century, improvements in the meat packing industry in South America led to a demand for Rather, the strategies were based solely on mass vaccination of all susceptible animals, using inactivated saponin-hydroxide vaccines of questionable quality. For most of the continent, that policy served to maintain the epidemiological status quo and, at best, attenuated morbidity of the disease. The exception was Chile which, due to its distinctive geography and epidemiological conditions, was the first South American country to eradicate the disease using the mass vaccination strategy.
Influence of foot and mouth disease on South American economies
The more lucrative markets among FMD-free countries (such as the USA and Japan) were closed to imports of South American beef for a long period, due mainly to the presence of the disease on the continent. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, adopted by the USA Congress in 1930, prohibited the importation into the USA of ruminants, pigs and meat and meat products of these animals from FMD-infected countries, except when those products were treated by heat and other methods which destroyed the FMD virus (8) . Under this Tariff Act, countries were considered free from FMD when European breeding stock in order to enhance the productivity of local populations. Unfortunately, this was the way foot and mouth disease (FMD) was introduced by animals imported from Europe. FMD was first identified in the Americas in 1870 on the north-eastern coast of the United States of America (USA), in the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina, in central Chile, Uruguay and in southern Brazil in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. By the early 20th century the disease had spread to the rest of Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. The disease appeared in Venezuela and Colombia in 1950, and ultimately spread to Ecuador in 1961.
While the USA (1929), Mexico (1947 Mexico ( -1954 and Canada (1952) undertook campaigns to eradicate FMD from their territories, the South American countries failed to implement effective measures to prevent FMD from entering and spreading within their borders. As a consequence of the introduction of FMD to Venezuela and Colombia in 1950, the Pan American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Center (PANAFTOSA) was established in Rio de Janeiro (9) . The project first functioned as a special programme of the Organisation of American States (OAS), and later as a regular programme of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
Activities to control FMD were initiated in the early 1960s. In 1961 Argentina created an institution specifically to deal with the control and eradication of FMD. The second country to adapted to take into account the characteristics of regions from which products originate and to which products are destined. In doing so, the Member Country should take into account relevant geography, ecology, methods of surveillance and effectiveness of control systems (27) . Thus, health requirements cannot be used as non-tariff trade barriers. Instead, international trade must be based on risk assessments and risk management.
A good example of managed risk is the importation by Europe of meat from South American countries under controlled conditions. Following the extensive FMD outbreaks in Europe between 1967 and 1968, the European Community (EC) established standards and procedures for the import of deboned frozen meat. These standards were based on strict rules and controls concerning the source of the cattle and conditions practised at abattoirs. The standards also require maturing and preparation of carcasses, including the removal of bones, lymph nodes and large blood vessels from the meat. These measures have been largely effective, since deboned frozen meat from millions of cattle have been exported to European countries -even in periods of extensive outbreaks of FMD in South America -without resulting in the introduction of the disease. In addition, during the past twenty years more than a million tons of deboned frozen meat were imported by the United Kingdom (UK), the fully susceptible livestock population of which remained free of FMD (26) .
The advances recorded in reducing disease incidence during the 1980s, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round discussions on non-tariff barriers in the world trade of meat and by-products of meat, convinced the livestock industry of the need to eradicate FMD from the continent. This favourable social, political and economic climate led to the formulation of the Hemispheric Plan for FMD Eradication (22) . This proposal was accepted by the Inter-Ministerial Meeting on Animal Health in 1987, with two main objectives: to eradicate FMD from endemic areas and to maintain and consolidate the status of those zones which were already free of the disease. One of the first concrete achievements of the plan was the endorsement, in June 1987, of the subregional project for FMD eradication in the Rio de la Plata Basin, comprising the most southern state of Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul), Mesopotamia of Argentina (Provinces of Misiones, Comentes and Entre Ríos), the entire territory of Uruguay and, more recently, the eastern region of Paraguay. The guidelines of the project included inter alia the participation of the local community, regionalising strategies and reinforced participation at the local level.
Foot and mouth disease surveillance on the continent Sound, reliable information is the basis for any disease control programme or risk assessment. In South America, information on FMD is generated by the Continental by PANAFTOSA (7,10,11) and later produced by official and private laboratories, proved to be extremely beneficial. These FMD vaccines afforded higher levels of protection of longer duration, which increased the confidence of the livestock community in the value of the vaccination strategies. Thus, the improved vaccines and the strategic use of those vaccines became major tools in the control and eradication effort.
As shown in Table I , FMD incidence rates stabilised at 4 to 8 cases for 10,000 cattle and 1 to 2 herds affected per thousand between 1982 and 1990. In the period following the initiation of the Hemispheric Plan for FMD Eradication, these values decreased further until morbidity rates reached levels of 0.68 cases per 10,000 cattle and 0.22 herds affected per thousand herds in 1996. The significance, of these figures is underlined by the fact that there has not been an outbreak of FMD in the southern area of the continent since 1995 (Table II) . The country has enjoyed freedom from FMD for two years, and is planning a serological survey to substantiate a request for official recognition by the OIE as a country 'free of FMD with vaccination'.
Brazil is making significant progress in controlling FMD. Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina recorded the absence of FMD for over two years and the states of Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul and Goiás have not had outbreaks for over a year. Thus the best livestock producing areas of the continent, comprising a territory with more than 140 million cattle in 1.3 million herds, are currentiy free of FMD.
Foot and mouth disease risk regionalisation
In 1995, PANAFTOSA proposed a regionalisation of South America according to risk levels for FMD (6) . The map in Figure 2 illustrates the present situation in relation to that 
Risk mitigation measures
All levels of risk mentioned above refer to unrestricted risk; that is, the risk to the animal health of an importing country if animals or animal products were to be imported without the implementation of risk mitigation measures (1). Examples of risk mitigation measures include quarantine, diagnostic testing, inspections, processing and restricted use. For instance, the EC rules applied to the harvest of meat for export to the EC made this commodity apparently safe for importation under the conditions which existed at that time in Europe (14, 15) . These risk mitigation procedures have been in use routinely for the past 20 years and have made an important contribution towards the development of a safe and highly technical meat industry. The EC standards for risk mitigation can be summarised as follows:
a) The region from which the source cattle for the meat shipment originate must have regular, officially controlled FMD vaccination programmes. This requirement was revoked for Uruguay when the vaccination programme ceased. Source animals must have remained in the region for at least three months before being slaughtered. Source catde may not originate from herds within a radius of 25 km from premises 
Scenario pathway and computer simulation
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) techniques have been used for many years in engineering and economics (17, 20) , but are relatively new to veterinary medicine (16, 18, 19, 21) . Such studies make use of branches of science such as epidemiology, statistics, mathematics, virology and pathology, and in this case of meat technology. Scenario pathway analysis (17, 19 ) is one of the methodologies which may be used to evaluate the risks of animal product importation. A QRA commences with the identification of a disease hazard posed by the importation of animals or animal products. A pathway of events is then traced for the commodity concerned, from the point of origin to final destination, in which each event determines whether the pathogen remains hazardous. The probability of the outcome is assessed quantitatively for each event. The accumulation of the probabilities of the outcome of all the events in the pathway constitutes the total measure of risk related to the importation (17, 21) . Figure 3 shows the scenario pathway used for the present assessment. The initial hazard is the importation of meat from South America if an FMD-infected source herd were to be included (the probability of including an infected herd depends on the disease incidence and the tonnage of meat to be exported). The first event in the scenario is the detection of FMD, or not, in the herd of origin by the surveillance system. If FMD is detected, the herd is disqualified for meat export. The next event is inspection of the cattle on the way to the abattoir. Other important risk mitigation events are the detection of FMD during ante-and post-mortem inspections. If FMD were still in the pathway at this point, it may then be eliminated by the maturation and deboning process or during freezing and storage of the meat. Table IV summarises the risk mitigation process, starting with Einitial, which is the export of meat from an FMD-infected source herd. Thus, the probability of the hazard occuring is 100% at this event (Pinitial = are the probabilities that Events 1-6 (E r E 6 )
occur. These probabilities are as follows: P x is the probability that the animal health surveillance system fails to detect FMD in the infected source herd; P 2 is the probability that transit controls fail to detect FMD in the herd en route to the abattoir; P 3 is the probability that ante-mortem inspection fails to reveal FMD in the herd after arrival at the abattoir; Contaminated meat (Endpoint) P 4 is the probability that post-mortem meat inspection fails to observe FMD lesions in one or more of the animals of the herd; P 5 is the probability of maturing and deboning failing to destroy or remove all FMD virus; P 6 is the probability of failure to destroy all FMD virus during freezing and transport of the meat. Pend = Pinitial X X P 2 X P 3 X P 4 X P 5 X P 6 .
For a first qualitative approximation, estimates can be made for each P according to a worst case scenario. However, the use of only one estimated value gives a very incomplete picture of the real risks involved, and ignores the fact that it is an estimate of only one potential outcome. In fact, a variety of values exist for each P which estimate the range (minimum and maximum) and a most-likely probability. Such values can then be used to simulate a so-called triangular probability distribution function (PDF) for each event in the scenario pathway. The PDFs which are generated for each event in the scenario tree can be combined by using computerised Monte Carlo simulation techniques. The authors used the commercially available @PJSK° program to generate a cumulative PDF to represent the total risk mitigation from all events of the complete scenario.
For the product of P initial x Pj x P 2 x P 3 x P 4 x P 5 x P 6 , evaluating the final probability (Pendpomt ) °f occurrence of the hazard assumes that each P value is completely independent. However, if certain values are not completely independent, the @PJSK° program allows for the introduction of a correlation factor. In the present work it was assumed that ante-mortem inspection (P 3 ) and meat inspection (P 4 ) have a certain degree of dependency (the level of detection efficiency at a given abattoir is related to the quality of local inspectors). However, simulations using high and low dependency between P 3 and P 4 only had a marginal effect on the final results.
Probability values for each event in the scenario pathway
The values assigned to each of the probabilities in the pathway were similar to those used in an earlier study (25) estimates are based on arguments described below, on official records, and on well-informed estimates by the authors and specialists consulted. However, if there was any doubt, the worst case scenario was adopted rather than risk criticism for excessive optimism.
PÌ: probability that animal health surveillance system fails to detect foot and mouth disease
The livestock community is well aware of the socio-economic consequences of not reporting a suspicious vesicular disease.
Of particular importance are the activities of the local commissions, in which there is a high degree of community 1994. None of these proved to be FMD, but it is interesting to note that the majority of the notifications were made by private veterinarians or the owners and handlers of the animals. The time-lapse between notification and response of the Veterinary Services was a matter of hours (13) . The authors assumed that under these conditions the probability that the surveillance system would fail to detect FMD in herds * The 'No risk pathway' assumes that action is taken to stop the entire shipment once evidence of FMD is discovered in even one animal in the shipment designated for the export of beef was remote. However, failure to detect FMD could occur in areas with high vaccination coverage and low morbidity, or if all the source cattle were still within the incubation period. A conservative estimate of the probability that such conditions would occur was assumed to be in a range of 1%-10%, with a likely value of 5%. P 2 : probability that foot and mouth disease is not detected during transit
Source cattle are transported direcdy to the approved abattoir without passing through a market. They do not come into contact with animals which do not comply with the EC meat import requirements. All people involved in the transportation of livestock have an obligation to report any disease sign which might suggest FMD. If clinical cases of FMD are present, those probably would be observed and reported. However, people involved in transit controls are probably less efficient than those working with the animal health surveillance system. In addition, FMD could still be in the incubation stage. The assumed range of 5%-50% and a most-likely value of 20% reflect this situation.
P 3 : probability that foot and mouth disease is not detected during ante-mortem inspection
Upon arrival at the abattoir, all documents are reviewed by a Veterinary Services official before the animals disembark. If everything is in order, the cattle move into a reception pen for ante-mortem inspection. At this point, individual animals are identified with the identification number and the herd number of the producer. Only animals belonging to the same herd are kept in the same resting pen. These pens are well lit and the cattle remain there for at least 24 hours, but not longer than 72 hours. Since FMD has a short incubation period, infection of the animals either at the farm of origin or in transit would probably be visible, with lesions on at least a few animals. It would be difficult to miss the feverish, salivating or lame animal and, therefore, the probability that the inspection process fails to detect at least one FMD animal is low. The detection of one animal with FMD would cause the cancellation of all meat exports from that abattoir or region. The probability of failing to detect at least one animal with signs of FMD was estimated to be 1%-10%, while the most-likely probability was estimated to be 5%. These values are very conservative and may be too pessimistic.
P 4 : probability that foot and mouth disease is not detected during post-mortem inspection
After at least 24 hours of rest, the animals are moved as a herd for slaughter. The basis for dealing effectively with the detection of FMD at post-mortem inspection is the identification system of each individual animal. As the skin is being removed, the initial identification numbers are printed on each quarter. In addition, each half carcass, the head, organs and intestines are all given the same number to facilitate retrieval of parts if any pathology were observed during post-mortem inspection. Of particular importance is the identification of the head and feet of each individual animal. Meat inspection technicians inspect the carcass after removal of the skin. If a pathology is observed, the area of concern is tagged and the entire animal is placed aside to await judgement of a veterinary officer. The tongue, oral mucosa, muzzle and feet of all cattle are inspected individually for acute or recovered vesicular lesions. It would be difficult for an inspector to miss developing vesicles or acute lesions. If the herd was infected shordy before leaving the farm or during transport, it is likely that at least a few of the animals would have developed lesions by this stage. Healing lesions of the convalescent animal are also very characteristic and would probably be found in more than one animal of the herd. As in the entire inspection process, any FMD foot lesion or any tongue lesion would cause an immediate interruption of all meat export operations from that abattoir (and in a low risk area from that region).
On account of the thorough individual inspection of each carcass, the authors assumed that the post-mortem inspection process would be at least five times more sensitive than the ante-mortem inspection.
P 5 : probability that foot and mouth disease virus survives maturation and deboning
After 24 hours of maturing at a temperature of 3°C-7°C, the acidity level is measured and a pH value of lower than 6.0 is required, since at that level FMD virus rapidly disintegrates. However, the effectiveness of the maturation depends on the amount of glycogen in the muscle at the time of slaughter, which in turn is influenced by the general health and the resting period of the animal. In addition, the desired pH is not always reached within lymph nodes, bone marrow or the contents of large blood vessels (12) . These parts therefore are removed, but human error cannot be completely ruled out in the reading of pH measurements and during the deboning operation. For instance, blood clots, bone chips and pieces of large vessels or parts of lymph nodes might not be removed completely.
No data are available on the kinetics of virus inactivation in meat at a pH of 6.0. In the absence of such information, it is difficult to estimate the amount of FMD virus which might survive in the meat of a matured, deboned carcass from a viraemic animal. For the above-mentioned reasons, the authors arbitrarily selected 10% as the most-likely probability for carcasses of viraemic catde to yield contaminated meat. The probability level was assumed unlikely to be less than 1% and not more than 30%. However, these figures may be overestimated, because experience with the importation of large quantities of deboned meat by Europe during epidemic periods supports the notion that the maturation process of the carcass is very effective.
P 6 : probability that foot and mouth disease virus survives freezing and transport
Since FMD virus resists freezing and survives in frozen meat, the probability of virus survival was assessed as being close to 100%.
Results of computer simulation
The above-estimated values were entered in an Excel/@RISK° worksheet (Table V) for the simulation of the probability that FMD virus might remain in the chain of events. Figure 4 shows the resulting PDF. The same data are presented as an ascending cumulative graph in Figure 5 .
The expected result that meat still contains FMD virus at the end of the chain is represented by the midpoint of the PDF, which is 10 6 ' 1 , meaning a chance of slightly more than one in a million. The cumulative graph predicts, with a 95%
probability, that this risk will not exceed 10 -5 ' 5 or one in 700,000. Even with the rather crude estimates used, which probably favour a worst case scenario, it is clear that a very large risk mitigation factor is obtained by adhering to strict standards for the harvesting of the beef for export to the EC as practised in South America.
Fig. 4
The total risk mitigation probability density function for the harvesting and processing of beef from a herd infected with foot and mouth disease virus Fig. 5 The total risk mitigation probability density function for the harvesting and processing of beef from a herd infected with foot and mouth disease (FMD) presented as a cumulative ascending graph The probability that the final risk mitigation is equal to or less than 1( 5 -5 is 95%
Discussion and conclusions
Risk evaluation or risk assessment has been used ever since the spread of animal diseases was contained by such measures as quarantine and control of animal movements. These assessments were mostly qualitative, were often both intuitively and scientifically based and were usually quite effective. Risk assessments, whether qualitative or quanti tative, must be consistent, transparent and well documented (17, 19, 21) . The information and conclusions on the risks Presently, a large area of the continent with excellent cattle-raising areas is included in low to moderate risk regions. As is the case everywhere else in the world, it is possible that FMD might be reintroduced into those regions. However, the chances of this happening become less likely with the progressive advances made in disease eradication in the remaining, higher risk areas of the continent. The national veterinary surveillance systems in the low-risk regions maintain active surveillance of possible vesicular disease cases and appear well prepared to deal with an eventual 
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• Riesgos de fiebre aftosa en la carne vacuna de origen sudamericano V. Astudillo, P. Sutmoller, V. Saraiva & A. López Resumen El grado de seguridad que ofrece la carne de vacuno en cuanto a su posible contaminación por el virus de la fiebre aftosa viene determinado por diversos factores: el nivel de riesgo asociado a la prevalencia de la enfermedad en la región exportadora; la fiabilidad del sistema de vigilancia de dicha región; la eficacia de las medidas de control y prevención; la eficiencia de los Servicios Veterinarios; y el grado de colaboración del sector privado. El continente sudamericano ha sido subdividido en regiones con arreglo a estos criterios. Hoy en día existen alrededor de 90 millones de cabezas de ganado vacuno en regiones calificadas de bajo a muy bajo riesgo de fiebre aftosa en lo que a la exportación de animales o productos animales se refiere. Ello representa un territorio de más de 5 millones de km 2 . Otros 50 millones de cabezas de ganado vacuno viven en regiones clasificadas como de riesgo moderado. Estas categorías reflejan varios niveles de riesgo. En las regiones exportadoras de Sudamérica, el sector productor de carne aplica una serie de medidas encaminadas a reducir los riesgos desde el rebaño de origen hasta la preparación final de la carne. Estas medidas reducen en casi seis órdenes de magnitud el riesgo en relación al riesgo no limitado. Por ello, el riesgo final de transmisión de fiebre aftosa por los intercambios internacionales de carne vacuna procedente de regiones sudamericanas de bajo riesgo es, de hecho, ínfimo.
